Introduction
In 1966 a new comic superhero had his debut: The Peacemaker, alias Christopher Smith, US diplomat and Special Envoy to the Geneva Arms Conference, a convinced pacifist who, as the subtitle announced,``Loves peace so much that he is ready to fight for it!'' 1 He took up arms for peace in his Peacemaker identity whenever diplomacy ceased to work. In the 4 th issue he fought against a villain from the Balkans and his guerrilla troops. 2 The Peacemaker, of course, successfully stopped this disturbance of world peace, by using one of his portable atomic bombs. 3 The conceptualisation of The Peacemaker superhero character in this 1960s comic is a telling example of the myth that has been constructed around some
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and Herzegovina that will serve as a case study in this article. 6 From a general perspective, peace processes can be considered as laboratories of lawmaking shaped by different (legal) actors. The role of mediation is usually analysed as one variation of an institutionalised form of third party involvement. The role of the individual mediator, however, is rarely the focus of analysis, while the traditional image of mediation, specifically the one promoted by the media, principally focuses on the enigmatic role of the charismatic individual expert-the peacemaker-shuttling from one place to another, trying to mediate between the parties and to negotiate an agreement to settle the conflict. 7 This article addresses the following questions: are mediators mere facilitators of a dialogue and negotiation process in a politically and legally set framework or are they-in their attempt not only to terminate a conflict but actively to create a sustainable peace process-in fact often dominating the process by procedurally and substantively imposing a peace agreement and predetermining the rules for the transition process? Which role is assigned to lawyers, law and lawmaking in mediation and peacemaking processes? For instance, does law set a framework or does it become an instrument or technique for the mediator/peacemaker to code the deal between the conflicting parties?
By taking Richard Holbrooke as a key example, the article seeks to describe and analyse the role of individual mediators in the negotiation and making of peace and peace agreements and their potential role in lawmaking in the grey zone between conflict and peace, as well as between the national and international sphere. At the same time, the author must remain aware of the danger of falling into the trap of mystifying Holbrooke's role as one of a superhero Peacemaker: the challenge is thus to describe and analyse the role of the individual mediator in peace and lawmaking processes by becoming immersed in, but not submerged by the``mystique'' or``art-talk'' around him.
Based on this outline, the article initially presents an overview of forms of mediation and functions of mediators in negotiation processes. As a leading example it then points to the mediation and negotiation processes in the conflicts following the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), most prominently the peace negotiation process for Bosnia and Herzegovina led by US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke. Next, Holbrooke's role will be compared to the practice of the UN Secretary-General (SG) in conflict mediation based on his good offices, with a particular focus on the role of Martti Ahtisaari as his Special Envoy in the Kosovo status negotiations from 2005 until 2007. Additionally, the article will also draw out processes of differentiation and professionalisation of peace mediation into so-called track one and track two processes. Against this background, the final question it addresses is whether a (professional) code of conduct is necessary or is in the process of being developed for peace mediators, especially when it comes to the growing number of private diplomacy and transnational mediation institutions.
The Role of Mediators in Peace Negotiations
Are there approaches and analytical frameworks that are designed to analyse, and in effect to``demystify'' , the role of mediators in peace and lawmaking processes? For a start, it is has to be acknowledged that negotiation and mediation often elude analysis due to their confidential character. Attempts to pursue for instance comprehensive discourse analysis are doomed to stagnate or fail due to the secrecy of talks and the lack of material to reconstruct them. A reason for this strict secrecy and exclusiveness, as well as avoidance of transparency and public participation, could be-next to dominantly political reasons-that negotiation outcomes, especially in form of peace agreements, could potentially be subject to some sort of judicial review. 8 Furthermore, it has been argued that it is not possible to develop patterns to analyse these processes and the role of actors involved on the basis that the observed differences in formats and functions would derive directly from the particular nature of the conflict situation and have their source in the respective characters of the intermediaries. The difficulties in generalising mediation processes and their participants is also closely related to the perception of mediation as a personal art of the mediator. 9 However, what does the existing body of social science literature say about mediation processes and the role of mediators in the making of peace and law?
Traditionally, mediation is understood as a political process in which parties to a violent conflict agree to the appointment of a third party to support them, impartially and without making binding decisions, in creating a negotiation process and reaching an agreement to end their conflict. Mediation, together with negotiation 10 and good office, 11 is considered part of a set of political and diplomatic methods of dispute settlement that are conducted on invitation and without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law.
12 This is also reflected in Article 33, Chapter VI on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes of the UN Charter. 15 Formulative mediation entails drafting agreements that are then presented and adapted by the parties. Thus, the mediator is required to enter the substance of the conflict and to make substantive contributions to the resolution process, including the development and proposal
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Cindy Daase manipulative or directive mediation. 16 The manipulative mediator has all the powers of the formulative mediator and, in addition, uses the position and leverage to manipulate the parties into an agreement. In effect, the manipulative mediator becomes a party to the negotiation process, making use of the capacity to add or subtract benefits to or from a certain solution.
17 While facilitative and formulative mediation are still in line with the traditional characteristics of mediation, manipulative mediation influences the agreements decisively through setting incentives and disincentives. This includes setting the negotiation agenda, invoking the authority of law, even imposing solutions, and using the threat of sanctions and of the use of force in case of non-cooperation and non-compliance by the parties. 18 The category of manipulative mediation, as will be shown in the example of Richard Holbrooke, is highly relevant to describing and analysing the potential role of contemporary mediators.
However, while mediation processes are mostly analysed according to their form and function, the role of the individual mediator is to some extent still an object of mystification and attributed with a set of characteristics, which are not directly connected with or covered by the above introduced categorisations. The mediator is seen as a charismatic figure or artist who performs his art-conducting a mediation and peacemaking process-thereby using his personal charisma as well as the skills and tools at hand. To grasp this enigmatic role of the mediator, the involvement of US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke in the complex setting of the dissolution of the SFRY will be taken as a leading example; it will then be compared to the role of the UN SG's good offices and of his Special Envoys in mediation processes, particularly the role of Martti Ahtisaari in the Kosovo status negotiations.
of new resolution options. At the same time the mediator is not in a position to push the conflict actors to endorse any particular outcome, or even to advocate a favoured outcome. Kleffner calls this``pro-active mediation'' . Kleffner, supra note 14, para. 12. 16 Directive mediation is strongly controlling the process and the framework in which it takes place. See S. S. Gartner and J. Bercovitch,`Overcoming Obstacles During and after the negotiation of the Dayton Agreement, Holbrooke's personality and controversial negotiation style-a sizeable ego and a tenacity and willingness to push hard for diplomatic results-won him both admiration and animosity and contributed to a certain mystification of his mediation skills. 26 His negotiation style earned him nicknames like the``Bulldozer'' or the``Raging Bull'' , and the label of being``Washington's favourite last-ditch diplomat'' . 27 Holbrooke himself decisively contributed to this complex image with numerous interviews and speeches but most prominently with``To End a War'' , his memoir of the Bosnian peace process. 28 With this book he fed the arguments of both his critics as well as his admirers and nourished the prejudice that diplomacy and peacemaking in the Balkans was a special art form.
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Based on his diaries, cables, interviews with companions and media reports, Holbrooke retraced the process from the five-nation Contact Group's efforts to reach a settlement from 1994, via a number of pre-negotiation agreements and a decisive ceasefire, 30 29 Holbrooke states in his book:``An aspect of the Balkan character was revealed anew: once enraged, these leaders needed outside supervision to stop themselves from self-destruction.'' Holbrooke, supra note 19, at 165; and Cohen, supra note 19, at 107. 30``T he terms of the deal were dictated and drafted largely by the Americans.`We wrote the shaky steps of implementing the Agreement in 1996/1997. His accounts leave absolutely no doubt that he had created and wanted the job of negotiator and that he saw himself in that role, which should not necessarily be seen as synonymous with that of an impartial mediator.
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In the eyes of some reviewers,``To End a War'' tells the story of a passionate US public servant driven by American values struggling for peace in Bosnia; 32 in the eyes of others it is an irritating egocentric account of the search for peace in the Balkans that, nevertheless, no student of the region and conflict mediation could afford to ignore. 33 In any case, Holbrooke's personal memories and the later released report and collection of documents on the Dayton negotiations of the State Department give an invaluable account of the negotiation process. 34 They illustrate the US's approach to use the threat of the use of force and the actual use of force by NATO to move the negotiation process along, most evident in Holbrooke's instigation:``Give us bombs for peace'' . 35 It was also the use of force that attracted the most criticism. 36 In document' , Holbrooke said flatly. But Holbrooke was careful to package the agreement in a tissue of niceties which would preserve the myth that the document had been a Serbian proposal with the Americans acting merely as its conveyor, and which would give Holbrooke, and his colleagues a very short arm's-length distance from the distasteful reality of having negotiated with criminals.'' Kelly, supra note 23, at 86. Holbrooke himself considered negotiations as improvisations within the framework of the general goal. His plan was to create a series of agreements, in a high frequency of meetings to narrow the space to manoeuvre for the parties, to create a momentum for peace, and to bring the three Presidents together. This meant step-by-step negotiations, then writing the results down and making them public, thereby locking the parties and then returning to the negotiation 39 nevertheless, for him``the single force most responsible for driving the negotiations onward has been the ego of Richard Holbrooke'' . 40 He continues:`F or Holbrooke…. the Balkan mission is the Kissingerian role of a lifetime that has been spent in the pursuit of power and attention. He has played this role-the superdiplomat-in the central crisis of the age-in a manner that anyone who has ever known him would instantly recognize as classical Holbrookean. '' 41 But what makes the process that led to the Dayton Agreement and the Agreement itself a``classical Holbrookean''? For Kelly, it is Holbrooke yelling and cursing at Presidents and Foreign Ministers, negotiating agreements at all costs and being the last man standing at two o'clock in the morning. 42 Also, members of Holbrooke's mediation team 43 contributed to the fixation on, and mystification of, the supermediator: James Pardew, then Director of the Balkan Task Force at the Department of Defence, stated in front of the media that it was Holbrooke's``conniving, playacting, seizing opportunity by instinct'' that contributed decisively to the success of the negotiations. 44 This became a problem during the negotiations, for instance, when it came to Annex 1-A, Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement. On Holbrooke's initiative, the lawyer Robert Perle was invited to support the Bosnian negotiation team. Holbrooke recalled:``Perle took the first available plane to Dayton and … started analyzing the military annex, whose bureaucratic language the Bosnians had been unable to decode… he closeted himself with the Bosnians, showing them the real, often hidden meaning of the jargon in Annex 1-A'' . 60 Perle's efforts resulted in a long list of changes and suggestions from the Bosnian side to the anger of some drafters of the US mediation team. Holbrooke commented on this situation in his memoir:
Most senior officials in Washington were still unhappy that Perle was in Dayton. Donilon warned me that the Washington consensus was to tell the Bosnians they had to accept Annex 1-A as originally written and reject all of their proposed changes.`Tell Perle to shove his goddamn changes up his ass' , one angry Pentagon official said when I warned him what to expect … I replied`We can't reject them all, and some of them make sense.' (…) Clark, Kerrick, Pardew, and I began a careful review of each suggestion, trying to decide how to deal with both the substance and the politics of his proposals.
61
The final Dayton Agreement, which consists of a Framework Agreement and 12 Annexes, provided for the mutual recognition of the FRY and the Republic BiH (Article X). Furthermore, all the international forces and organs foreseen by the Agreements were not created by the parties or by any other instruments agreed upon in Dayton, but rather by later decisions of various international organisations, in particular the UN and NATO. 62 Remarkable is also Annex 4, the Constitution. The Constitution is not the result of a classical process of constitution making and it is also no coincidence that its original language is English, as the main actors who led the drafting process were Richard Holbrooke, Carl Bildt and Robert Owen. 63 Annex 4 was approved in separate declarations by the BiH Republic, the Federation and the Republika Srpska, and entered into force upon signature of the General Framework Agreement, thereby amending and superseding the BiH Republic's existing Constitution.
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The Constitution not only commits BiH to a comprehensive list of international human rights agreements; it is, beyond this, open to the direct application of international law, and it is even considered as being`supervised' by international law. 65 67 In a nutshell, the Dayton Agreement was an attempt to broaden traditional conceptions of peace agreements and ceasefires and to provide a blueprint using internationalised standards for the post-war reconstruction. 68 The peace agreement has been paradigmatic for an internationalised mediation and peace process in terms of the powers it vests in international institutions and personnel. 69 The role of the lawyers involved in this process seems to be one of gatekeepers and of technicians who create the code to transcribe and seal the deal.
In the end, the Dayton Agreement has been widely credited with ending a war, while both the negotiation process led by Richard Holbrooke and the resulting agreement have been severely criticised for failing to reduce substantially interethnic tensions as well as to guarantee an effective and responsible ownership by the people of BiH. 70 In sum, Richard Holbrooke acted in the enigmatic and interpretative office of a Special Envoy of the US President, a position usually given to a person to negotiate with full authority of the President when it would be too sensitive for the US President or Secretary of State to act in person. 71 In 1998, Bill Clinton sent Holbrooke, who was then US Ambassador to the UN, on another troubleshooting mission: the Kosovo crisis. 72 His attempts to negotiate an arrangement with Milosevic failed at this point in time, and observers attested Holbrooke a very flat learning curve in dealing with the charismatic Serbian President.
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Seven years later another diplomat was sent out, this time as a Special Envoy of the SG, to negotiate the future status of Kosovo: Martti Ahtisaari. Arnault once held that the conflict between the creation of a negotiated settlement and current international legal standards is never as acute as when the UN serves as a mediator. This leads to the question which kind of institutionalised framework the UN and the SG offer for mediation and negotiation processes. 
The Secretary-General's Good Offices and Mediation
Since the end of the Cold War, the SG and the UN have grappled with concepts to address so-called new and asymmetric conflicts. This has led to intensified discussions about already existing approaches, forms and standards of UN involvement, especially in intra-state conflicts and peace processes. Mediation is one of the means at the disposal of the SG to initiate and accompany peace Arnault's statement was echoed by The UN Peacemaker database:``When the United Nations is called upon to mediate a resolution to a conflict, it means that the parties have accepted the United Nations Peacemaker to help and provide solutions to resolve the conflict. A United Nations mediation mandate grants authority to the Secretary-General or his Envoys to listen to the parties and to propose ideas and solutions. While the final outcome has to be agreed to by the parties, being a United Nations Mediator entails a much greater responsibility and involvement in the outcome of the conflict. A United Nations mediation mandate gives the parties the opportunity to avail themselves of the experience and best practices that the Organisation has gained in the field of conflict resolution.'' The UN Peacemaker, <http://peacemaker.unlb.org/index1.php> [last accessed 13 August 2012].
processes. 75 In 2005, the UN World Summit agreed to strengthen both the SG's capacity to mediate disputes and the SG's good office. 76 Good office is commonly understood as the deployment of diplomatic means for the settlement of disputes through a modest form of third party involvement in which the third party encourages or supports the disputing parties to resume negotiations but does not actively take part in them. 77 This conceptual difference is in practice blurred, and it is often difficult to determine whether the third party has only brought the disputing parties together or whether it also actively assisted them in reaching a compromise-which would be the role of the mediator. 78 The SG's role in the mediation of inter-and intra-state conflicts can be inferred from the position of the SG envisioned by the UN Charter as one of the principle organs of the UN. 79 The SG, as a mediator, is equipped with the authority of his office. 80 During the last two decades, the SG was not able to exercise this function in person for every conflict. To address various conflict situations and issues at the same time, the SG began appointing more and more Special Envoys and Special Representatives. 81 There is no generally agreed definition of who, equipped with which mandate, is considered as a Special Envoy or Special Representative-the terms are often used synonymously. However, there is the tendency to call someone a Special Representative if he/she is appointed on behalf of a collective body, for instance the Security Council (SC), and to speak of a Special Envoy when a person is chosen and appointed on the initiative of the SG. 82 The competence of the SG to appoint Special Envoys could be read into Articles 97-101 of the UN Charter. 83 It is even argued that the authority of the SG to choose and appoint Special Envoys has developed into a rule of customary international law. This would have to derive from the practice and opinio iuris of the member states of the UN and should not be confused with practice of an office shaped by the individual SG. 84 More convincing is the finding that the appointment of Special Envoys seems to be a practice-adapted and well-tried mechanism of conflict mediation and settlement by the SG's office. appointment of a Special Envoy like Martti Ahtisaari, is that the individual is purportedly acting under a personal mandate of the world's only global organisation with an assumed unparalleled legitimacy which provides a set of standards and a normative framework for mediation and negotiation processes. 86 In sum, the SG and the SG's Special Envoys face the challenge of acting as mediators on this basis, promoting global norms whilst retaining the freedom and leverage to shape and adapt their office to a particular situation, and sometimes contradicting local needs, as can also be demonstrated by the example of Noble Prize Laureate Martti Ahtisaari. 87 In 2005, the SG appointed former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari as his Special Envoy to lead a process that was supposed to determine the status of Kosovo. 88 The beginning of the final status talks was conditional on meeting a set of internationally established benchmarks and standards. 89 This mediation is mostly perceived as a form of mandatory mediation due to a lack of other means for the parties to settle their dispute over Kosovo's political and legal status. Representatives from the Serbian government (including representatives of Kosovo Serbs), the Kosovo delegation (including opposition representatives) and the Contact Group 90 began regular meetings in Vienna to reach a settlement. The parties met every few weeks to discuss draft agreements that had been prepared by Ahtisaari Envoy Ahtisaari was undeniably very difficult in terms of its political and legal dimensions. Additionally, the task of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the future status process for Kosovo (UNOSEK) 91 was not only to organise the schedule of negotiations but also to provide Special Envoy Ahtisaari with legal and political advice, inter alia to ensure that a proposed agreement would be in line with international law. Despite all efforts, the negotiation process stagnated in summer/autumn 2006. 92 The Serbian side held that Ahtisaari was in fact mediating in favour of the representatives of Kosovo, whose goal was independence, a suspicion that was also strongly reflected in the media. 93 In the end, the question was whether Ahtisaari would be able to lead the status negotiations to an effective agreement between the parties or whether he had to redefine his office as a Special Envoy and mediator to find and provide a solution to the conflict. This made the mediator in effect the status maker.
In 2007, Martti Ahtisaari made recommendations regarding Kosovo to the Security Council in which he came up with a model solution: a supervised independence for Kosovo. 94 The so-called Ahtisaari Plan was endorsed by the SG but not taken up by the SC in a Chapter VII Resolution. 95 The Ahtisaari Plan was later included in Kosovo's Declaration of Independence and can be considered as the foundation of Kosovo's supervised sovereignty; it also informed the constitution-making process and made its way inter alia into Article 143 of Kosovo's Constitution. 96 In contrast to the mandatory mediation and solution finding performed during the Kosovo status negotiations, Ahtisaari, for whom``[p]eace is a question of will'' , 97 underlined in his Nobel speech:``The task of the mediator is to help the parties to open difficult issues and nudge them forward in the peace process. The mediator's role combines those of a ship's pilot, consulting 132
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The UN Peacemaker database also defines who is a peacemaker 119 and what is understood as mediation, 120 it gives advice on how to build a negotiation team (including legal experts), 121 and it promotes that peacemaking is bound by international law, which is also reflected in drafting examples and handbooks. 122 Around the same time, Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) commenced a report initiative to identify standards and operational principles for peace mediation. 123 The report offers practical guidance for the development of professional good conduct in mediation and peace processes. It does not seek to give precise guidance for specific situations but offers a frame of reference to support professional decision-making. It holds that a mediator has to be acceptable to all parties and not imposed upon any of them and that this impartial mediator must act in the best interests of the peace process. 124 Moreover, the mediator must assume ultimate accountability for his or her choices, actions and decisions throughout a peace process and may even decide to withdraw from a peace process when negotiations are obviously pursued in bad faith or are leading to a solution that is unworkable, illegal or profoundly at odds with the mediator's core values. 125 These guidelines seem to be addressed to a particular kind of mediator, i.e. members of NGOs or so-called private diplomacy institutions that are playing an increasingly important role. Hence, this could be considered as a first attempt at self-regulation of these institutions. 126 In conclusion, it is possible to discern the development of a differentiated and professional peace service landscape, which goes hand in hand with the outsourcing of some aspects of mediation by states and international organisations and the growth of a competing private diplomacy and mediatioǹ`i ndustry'' . The impact of this on the future development of the role of individual mediators and institutionalised mediation processes remains to be seen.
Conclusion and Outlook
By taking US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke and the negotiation of the Dayton Peace Agreement as a key example, this article has described and analysed the role of a mysterious superhero peacemaker in a mediation and lawmaking process. This served as a basis for comparison with the role of the UN SG in mediation processes, in particular that of his Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari in the Kosovo status negotiations. It revealed that mediators are more than mere facilitators of a negotiation process. The role of the mediator in contemporary peace processes often goes beyond facilitating a dialogue-on invitation-between belligerent parties. Mediation is rather more often pro-active, with the mediator actively shaping the procedural and substantive aspects of negotiations by designing, offering or even dictating frameworks and solutions to the parties. Based on their mandate, professional expertise and a developing code of conduct, mediators become active part(ies) in negotiation processes and often take up the role of standard setters and norm promoters. Mediators can decisively influence the parties' decisionmaking by setting goals and using incentives or the threat of sanctions, or even the threat of the use of force, to push the parties to a solution. In this context, (international) law sets the limits and the framework for mediation and negotiation processes. The individual mediator becomes the bridge between these constraints and the necessity of addressing a particular conflict and mediating particular party-interests. Then law serves as a tool or technique for mediators/peacemakers to code the deal between the parties to the conflict.
Thus, the office of the mediator may be constrained by a mandate, external standards and structures, but it is then translated into practice by the individual mediator's skills in balancing and melding these with the status quo ante on the ground. In this setting, the individual mediator creates, and can even actively take part in, peace and lawmaking processes and thus, the development of (international) law. Admittedly, it remains difficult to decode and de-mystify
